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ABSTRACT
Deployment of deep learning in different fields and industries is
growing day by day due to its performance, which relies on the
availability of data and compute. Data is often crowd-sourced and
contains sensitive information about its contributors, which leaks
into models that are trained on it. To achieve rigorous privacy
guarantees, differentially private training mechanisms are used.
However, it has recently been shown that differential privacy can
exacerbate existing biases in the data and have disparate impacts
on the accuracy of different subgroups of data. In this paper, we aim
to study these effects within differentially private deep learning.
Specifically, we aim to study how different levels of imbalance in
the data affect the accuracy and the fairness of the decisions made
by the model, given different levels of privacy. We demonstrate
that even small imbalances and loose privacy guarantees can cause
disparate impacts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Given the high performance of deep learning algorithms in a variety
of tasks, they are widely deployed. These algorithms rely on large
data sets and high performance compute to perform well. This data
is often crowd-sourced and likely contains sensitive information
about its contributors [29]. It has been shown widely in the liter-
ature that machine learning models, and more specifically DNNs,
tend to memorize information from the training set [4, 9]. There
are a plethora of attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities in DNNs
and extract sensitive information (e.g. gender, ethnicity, genetic
markers) from models in both black and white box settings [13, 27].
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To mitigate this, Differential Privacy (DP) is used. DP can protect
against attempts to infer the contribution of a given individual
to the training set by adding noise to the computations [1, 10].
DP is used in many contexts, including in medical settings [28]
and is also used to protect 2020 US Census data [2]. The most
prominent DP algorithm in deep learning is DP-Stochastic Gradient
Descent (DP-SGD) [1] wherein noise is added to clipped gradients
during training. In this work, Abadi et al. introduce the moments
accountant, which is a method that keeps track of the exhausted
privacy budget over time and amplifies privacy during training.
The moments accountant returns the overall budget used and the
privacy leakage, which are demonstrated with ϵ and δ , respectively.
Although DP-SGD offers rigorous privacy guarantees, it degrades
the accuracy of the resulting model. Furthermore, it has recently
been shown that this degradation is disparate; minority subgroups
of data suffer more utility loss compared to others [5, 19].
Bagdasaryan et al. [5] empirically show that if DP-SGD is used
on data which is highly imbalanced, as in contains subgroups with
extremely small populations, the less represented groups which
already have lower accuracy end up losing more utility: "the poor
become poorer". They also show that as stricter privacy guarantees
are imposed, this gap gets wider. This gap can have huge societal
and economic implications. For instance, [19] shows that if DP was
used in the decision making of a fund allocation problem (based on
US Census data), smaller districts would end up with comparatively
more funding than what they would receive without DP, and larger
districts would get less funding.
To achieve a deeper insight into the effects of differential privacy,
we set out to study in detail the behavior of deep learning models
trained using DP-SGD. To be more precise, we set out to study a
wider range of imbalance than what was explored by Bagdasaryan
et al.. They studied datasets in which the minority subgroup formed
0.01% − 5.00% of the entire data. We, on the other hand, study less
significant imbalances as well.We cover a range of 0.1%−30% for the
population of the minority subgroup (30% might not be considered
a minority, however it is a common imbalance to have in datasets).
We also explore a wider range of privacy budget. Bagdasaryan et al.
study ϵ in range of 3 to 10, whereas we also consider ϵ = 1.15
and ϵ = 16.2. Our results show that if there are two subgroups in
the data and the minority group comprises 30% the data (CelebA
data and the minority group is male), which is actually a large
portion and is the case for many datasets, using differential privacy
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with ϵ = 16.2 and ϵ = 4.98 yields 5.1% and 5.2% more disparity in
accuracy between the two subgroups (female vs. male). We show
that increasing the imbalance (i.e. decreasing the population of
the minority subgroup to 0.1%) increases this disparity to 19% and
52% respectively. This result shows that even when differential
privacy is applied with loose guarantees, on datasets with negligible
imbalance, it can have a huge impact on the minority subgroups.
We also study the fairness metrics demographic parity and equality
of opportunity, finding that as datasets become more imbalanced
and stricter privacy guarantees are used the fairness, with respect
to these two metrics, of models is reduced.
2 RELATEDWORK
While there have been several papers related to fairness and differ-
ential privacy, works most relevant to ours are mentioned below.
Bagdasaryan et al. [5] empirically demonstrates a disproportion-
ately large reduction in accuracy for subgroups when modeled
using neural networks trained with DP-SGD. For example, a gen-
der classification model trained using DP-SGD on the Flickr-based
Diversity in Faces (DiF) dataset [24] and the UTKFace dataset [32]
dataset has a much lower accuracy when classifying black faces
compared to white faces. Similar results were also found when
performing sentiment analysis on a corpus of African-American
English tweets [6, 7], species classification on iNaturalist nature
images [31], and federated learning of a language model on a public
Reddit comments dataset [22]. As discussed in the introduction,
our work is different from the one by Bagdasaryan et al. in that
we study a wider range of privacy budgets and also a wider range
of data imbalances. Apart from that, we also use other notions of
privacy, such as equality of opportunity and demographic parity.
The work by Kuppam et al. [19] proposes novel measures of
fairness in the context of randomized DP algorithms and identifies
causes of outcome disparities.
Our paper builds on these above works by experimenting with
varied data imbalance ratios and seeks to measure the difference in
equality of opportunity and demographic parity, common metrics
of fairness. Other seminal papers addressing fair decision making
include [16, 17, 20, 30]
3 BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the fundamental privacy and fairness
concepts used throughout the paper.
3.1 Differentially Private SGD (DP-SGD)
Differential Privacy [11, 12] provides a strong privacy guarantee
for algorithms on aggregate databases. For ϵ ≥ 0, an algorithm A is
understood to satisfy Differential Privacy if and only if for any pair
of datasets that differ in only one element, the following statement
holds true.
P[A(D) = t] ≤ eϵ P[A(D′) = t] ∀t
Where D and D ′ are differing datasets by at most one element, and
P[A(D) = t] denotes the probability that t is the output of A. This
setting approximates the effect of individual opt-outs byminimising
the inclusion effect of an individualâĂŹs data.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) is an iterative method for
optimising differentiable objective functions. It updates weights
and biases by calculating the gradient of a loss function on small
batches of data. DP-SGD [1] is a modification of the stochastic gradi-
ent descent algorithm which provides provable privacy guarantees.
It is different from SGD because it bounds the sensitivity of each
gradient and is paired with a moments accountant algorithm to
amplify and track the privacy loss across weight updates. The mo-
ments accountant accumulates and tracks the privacy expenditure
in the training process of deep neural networks. Moments accoun-
tant significantly improves on earlier privacy analysis of SGD and
allows for meaningful privacy guarantees for deep learning trained
on realistically sized datasets [8].
In order to ensure SGD is differentially private (i.e. DP-SGD),
there are two modifications to be made to the original SGD algo-
rithm. First, the sensitivity of each gradient must be bounded. This
is done by clipping the gradient in the l2 norm. Second, one applies
random noise to the earlier clipped gradient, multiplying its sum by
the learning rate, and then using it to update the model parameters.
3.2 Fairness & Bias In Machine Learning
Fairness in machine learning is a measure of the degree to which
there is a disparate treatment for different groups which should
have been treated equally (e.g. female vs. male). Hence an algorithm
whose decisions skew towards a particular group of people can be
said to be unfair.
The definitions of fairness can fall under individual fairness,
group fairness and subgroup fairness [23]. Individual fairness is
where similar predictions are provided for similar individuals. Group
fairness refers to equal treatment of various groups. Subgroup fair-
ness obtains the best properties of the former groups by picking a
group fairness constraint and asking if it holds over a large collec-
tion of subgroups [18].
Like people, algorithms are also susceptible to biases. There are
many different types of bias as discussed in Mehrabi et al. [23].
Historical Bias refers to the bias which already exists due to prior
historical biases or socio-technical issues in society. For example,
a 2018 image search result involving female CEOs showed fewer
images since only 5% of Fortune 500 CEOs were women. Repre-
sentation Bias can result from the way we define and sample a
population (e.g. lack of geographical diversity in ImageNet). Algo-
rithmic bias is caused when a bias is generated by the algorithm
without being present in the input data.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our experiments implement a ResNet18 model [15], pre-trained
on ImageNet, to perform smile classification on a subset of 30,000
images from the CelebA dataset [21]. During the course of train-
ing, we experiment with both data imbalance ratios, as well as
with the hyperparameter settings used by DP-SGD- specifically
the amount of noise applied (σ ) and the gradient clipping level (S).
Following Bagdasaryan et al. [5] we compute privacy budget ϵ for
each training run using the RÃľnyi DP [25] implementation.
We implement our experiments using PyTorch [26] and ran them
on four Nvidia K80 GPUs. After hyperparameter optimisation using
grid search; we use a batch size of 32, a learning rate of 0.00005, and
train for 60 epochs. Adam optimiser is used to minimise our loss
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Table 1: Overall accuracy results and the delta when com-
pared to the non-DP baseline for the 90% female imbalanced
dataset.
Privacy level Accuracy (%) ∆ (%)
High (ϵ = 1.15) 71.05 -20.6
Medium (ϵ = 4.98) 85.61 -6.04
Low (ϵ = 16.2) 87.51 -4.14
Non-DP 91.65 0
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Figure 1: Smile detection accuracy delta between subgroups
(female - male) vs. dataset imbalance at varying levels of DP.
function. A full training run of 60 epochs with differential privacy
applied takes 20 hours to converge in this setup.
The gender balance of the CelebA subset was manipulated to
ensure that females were always the majority. The gender imbal-
ances considered were: 99.9% (29,970) female to 0.1% male (30), 99%
(29,700) to 1% (300) male, 90% (27,000) female to 10% (3,000) male,
80% (24,000) female to 20% (6,000) male, 70% (21,000) female to 30%
(9,000) male. The primary attribute of smiling was held constantly
balanced with each of the manipulated datasets containing 15,000
smiling and 15,000 non-smiling examples.
Results were then collected across each of the imbalance levels
at varying levels of noise while holding all other privacy-related
hyperparameters constant (δ = 10−6, S = 5). The noise multiplier,
z = σS , was varied to ensure a ratio between noise and gradient
clipping was enforced. This led to the consideration of three differ-
ent differential privacy levels across each of the imbalance datasets:
high (ϵ = 1.15,δ = 10−6, z = 1.5) medium (ϵ = 4.98,δ = 10−6, z =
0.7) and low (ϵ = 16.2,δ = 10−6, z = 0.5). A baseline without any
differential privacy applied (Non-DP) was also recorded.
Furthermore, gradient clipping was varied (S = 1, S = 5, S = 10)
and studied using the 70% female to 30% male dataset, across the
three different privacy levels.
4.1 Impact of DP on Accuracy at Test Time
Empirically we find that model utility has an inverse relationship
with information leakage- as greater privacy guarantees are placed
on the model, the overall accuracy of the model decreases. An
example of our results are shown in Table 1. This observation
agrees with the work of Alvim et al. [3].
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Figure 2: Smile detection accuracy across groups vs. gradient
clipping at varying levels of DP.
Figure 1 shows that data imbalance appears to have little effect
on the difference (∆) between subgroup accuracies (i.e. female accu-
racy minus male accuracy) until the split between the subgroups is
extreme at 99.9% vs 0.1%. This is demonstrated by the similar accu-
racy deltas across all privacy levels up until the most extreme level
of data imbalance at which point accuracy deltas diverge. Interest-
ingly, up to the most extreme level of imbalance, it is the highest
privacy level (ϵ = 1.15) which most closely matches the non-DP
baseline. We hypothesise that at this level of differential privacy
the noise and clipping techniques applied during the training pro-
cess obfuscate the gradient signal to such an extent whereby all
samples have a similar training effect. Therefore, while the overall
model utility reduces, due to noisier gradients, the utility difference
between subgroups actually improves. This phenomenon is seen
again in experiments with different clipping levels, as shown in
Figure 2, where the strictest privacy guarantee has the smallest
accuracy difference between subgroups (4.24%). This is an impor-
tant takeaway; increasing the privacy does not necessarily make
the utility disparity worse. There is a point in which the utility is
diminished so much, that the classifier is almost random, and at
that point, it actually becomes less disparate.
4.2 Impact of DP on Accuracy During Training
From Figure 3 it is clear that the training accuracy is highest without
any privacy guarantee (Non-DP) and the accuracy across all groups
(overall, female, male) at all time steps reduces as stricter privacy
guarantees are used.We see that even very weak privacy guarantees
(ϵ = 16.2) significantly impact the rate of convergence in training,
as well as the final utility of the trained model.
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that when conducting training efforts
without any privacy guarantees (Non-DP) the difference in accu-
racy disparity (∆ accuracy) between female and male subgroups
remains relatively constant. However, for all differentially private
training runs the accuracy delta between female and male sub-
groups diverges throughout training, with lower levels of privacy
(ϵ = 4.98, ϵ = 16.2) suffering from greater divergence than stricter
measures.
We hypothesise that the divergence observed during training
with DP-SGD is due to the gradient clipping which bounds the
influence of outliers. There are fewer examples of the minority
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Figure 3: Smile detection accuracy for differing groups (over-
all, female, male) vs. training step at varying levels of DP on
the 70% female dataset.
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Step
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Dataset Imbalance
80% Female
90% Female
99% Female
Group
Overall
Female
Male
Figure 4: Smile detection accuracy for differing groups (over-
all, female,male) vs. training step at varying levels of dataset
imbalance. Trained with (ϵ = 4.98,δ = 10−6)-DP.
group in each training mini-batch thus their gradients are higher
and therefore more likely to be clipped. This hampers the model’s
ability to learn effectively from theminority groupmeaning that the
bulk of the accuracy gain of themodel is obtained from performance
increases on the majority group. This effect then compounds over
the course of model training; as the model becomes more proficient
at accurately detecting the majority group, an increasing proportion
of the minority group training examples become outliers, with
clipped gradients, leading to a diverging accuracy gap between the
subgroups.
Figure 4 demonstrates that more imbalanced datasets cause a
larger divergence in accuracy between subgroups during the course
of training. This reinforces the above hypothesis; datasets with
smaller minority groups are more quickly impacted by the effects
of gradient clipping leading to more glaring divergence over time.
4.3 Impact of DP on Fairness Metrics
To measure the effects of DP on fairness, we have chosen two
metrics that are commonly used in the literature: difference in
Demographic Parity (∆DemP ) and the difference in Equality of Op-
portunity (∆EO ) [14]. Figure 5 shows the results. In a classification
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Figure 5: (a) ∆DemP and (b) ∆EO vs. dataset imbalance at vary-
ing levels of DP.
task, demographic parity requires the conditional probability of
the classifier predicting output class Yˆ = y given sensitive variable
S = 0 to be the same as predicting class Yˆ = y given S = 1. Here the
sensitive feature is gender. ∆DemP is the difference between these
two probabilities and the lower this difference, the more fair the
classifier. This metric is not suitable for the cases where the target
and sensitive variables are correlated. This does not concern our
case, however, since smiling and gender are unrelated.
Equality of opportunity is another fairness measure, which re-
quires the conditional probability of the classifier predicting class
Yˆ = 1 given sensitive variable S = 0 and ground truth class Y = 1
be equal to the same conditional probability but with S = 1. Similar
to the demographic parity case, we also measure the difference in
these conditional probabilities. The overall trend that we observe
in Figure 5 is that when we move to high levels of data imbalance,
both the fairness metrics get worse, across all levels of privacy. The
trend is similar to that of Figure 1, especially for the ∆EO . We can
see that there are some small differences between the two fairness
metrics, especially in the high privacy model, and especially for
the highly imbalanced case. We assume that the fact that the high
privacy model is doing better in terms of demographic parity and
worse in terms of equal opportunity is due to the precision of the
high privacy model actually getting worse.
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we study how different levels of imbalance in the
data can have disparate effects on the model accuracy as well as
the fairness of the decisions. Our studies yield the following im-
portant results: a) The disparate impact of differential privacy on
model accuracy is not limited to highly imbalanced data and can
occur in situations where the classes are slightly imbalanced. b)
The disparate impacts are not limited to high privacy levels- even
for loose guarantees, DP has disparate impacts on model accuracy.
c) By increasing the privacy level, we do not always see an increase
in disparate impacts, since tighter privacy guarantees degrade the
utility so much that the model becomes more random and therefore
more fair. For future work, we plan to delve deeper and explore the
effects of imbalanced data for tasks related to natural language pro-
cessing. Furthermore, we wish to propose a mitigation mechanism
that would help discover bias and decrease it, using recourse or
semi-supervised learning. We encourage future research direction
in this space with different data modalities.
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